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                 Abstract 
A recent decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court has led to improved jury instructions 
that incorporate psychological research documenting that memory does not operate like a video 
recording. Here we consider how cognitive neuroscience could contribute to addressing memory 
in the courtroom. We discuss conditions in which neuroimaging can distinguish true and false 
memories in the laboratory, and note reasons to be skeptical about its use in courtroom cases. We 
also discuss neuroscience research concerning false and imagined memories, misinformation 
effects, and reconsolidation phenomena that may enhance understanding of why memory does 
not operate like a video recording. Memory and law  3 
 
  In November 2003, Larry Henderson was accused of holding a gun on James Womble 
while another man shot Rodney Harper to death in a Camden, New Jersey apartment on New 
Year’s Day of that year.   Almost two weeks after the murder, Womble identified Henderson 
from a photo array. Womble again identified Henderson at trial, and Henderson was easily 
convicted of reckless manslaughter and aggravated assault amongst other changes. An open and 
shut case? Turns out not so. There were problems with Womble’s seemingly convincing 
evidence: for instance, Womble failed to identify Henderson at the initial photo array, until the 
investigating officers intervened and exerted ‘pressure’ or ‘nudging’, and Womble had ingested 
crack cocaine and copious amounts of wine and champagne on the day of the murder.   
Eventually this case (and a companion case) reached the New Jersey Supreme Court, 
which issued a ruling in 2011 that garnered wide public attention
1.  The decision showed a 
sophisticated appreciation of the problem of eyewitness memory and put in place a bold new 
solution. The case changed the legal standard for assessing eyewitness evidence to produce a 
better one - one that will more successfully deter inappropriate conduct by law enforcement and 
will help jurors to better evaluate evidence based on eyewitness memory. As a result of the 
Henderson case, defendants who can show some evidence of suggestive influences are entitled to 
a hearing in which all factors that might have a bearing on the eyewitness evidence are explored 
and weighed. If, after weighing the evidence presented at the hearing, the judge decides to admit 
the eyewitness evidence into trial, then the judge will provide appropriate, tailored jury 
instructions that will guide jurors on how to evaluate the eyewitness evidence. The new 
framework was created to serve the aim of not only protecting the government’s Memory and law  4 
interest in being able to present critical evidence at trial, but also the defendant’s interest in being  
able to have the tools necessary to mount an effective defense. 
 
Henderson’s initial trial might have ended differently for him if he had this new legal 
standard in place at the time.  He would have easily succeeded in showing suggestive influence, 
and if the judge decided to admit the eyewitness testimony despite the showing of 
suggestiveness, then Henderson’s trial jury would have received “appropriate, tailored jury 
instructions” that contained critical information about the nature of human memory. 
  The tailored jury instructions
2 were drafted over the next year and made public on July 
19, 2012. From a scientific point of view, they are a vast improvement over any prior jury 
instructions on eyewitness evidence. The eyewitness instruction, coming from the judge, tells 
jurors that: “human memory is not foolproof. Research has shown that human memory is not at 
all like a video recording that a witness need only replay to remember what happened. Human 
memory is far more complex (p. 2).” Later on, the instructions urge jurors to consider various 
factors that could affect the eyewitness testimony, and provide explicit information on how to 
think about those factors.  For example, in cases involving the identification of a stranger of a 
different race, the instructions state: “You should consider that in ordinary human experience, 
people may have greater difficulty in accurately identifying members of a different race (p.5).” 
As another example, in cases involving a great deal of stress or fright on the part of an 
eyewitness, the instructions state: “Even under the best viewing conditions, high levels of stress 
can reduce an eyewitness’s ability to recall and make an accurate identification (p.3).”  
What is impressive about these instructions is that unlike past ones that might have told 
jurors that they could take into account the state of mind of the witness, or the cross racial nature Memory and law  5 
of the identification, the new instructions educate the juror about how to take these factors into 
account. The jurors were previously left to their intuitions about the factors, and many of those 
intuitions are unsupported or even contradicted by scientific evidence
3,4. Many jurors will thus 
enter the deliberations with the erroneous belief that stress makes memory exceptionally accurate 
or that cross race identifications are just as accurate as same race ones
3. But in New Jersey they’ll 
become educated before making decisions that affect someone’s liberty.    
Cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and the legal system   
  The New Jersey court’s decision relied on, and receives strong support from, decades of 
research from cognitive psychology showing that human memory does not work like a video 
recording; it is prone to various kinds of errors, distortions, and illusions (for recent reviews, see 
5-9). Such cognitive studies have established that eyewitnesses sometimes report confident but 
inaccurate memories and that post-event suggestions or misinformation can easily taint 
eyewitness memory
10-12. There is also evidence that identifying members of a different race is 
typically more difficult than identifying members of the same race
13, and that high levels of 
stress can impair the accuracy of eyewitness memory
14. Highlighting the relevance of these 
findings to the courtroom, faulty eyewitness testimony was a factor in more than three-quarters 
of the first 250 cases nationwide in which DNA evidence exonerated individuals after conviction 
for crimes they did not commit
15.  Thus, in our view the New Jersey court devised its new jury 
instructions based on strong evidence from cognitive psychology that is clearly relevant to issues 
of pressing concern in the courtroom. 
At the same time that cognitive studies have documented various kinds of memory errors 
and illuminated the conditions in which eyewitnesses are prone to them, neuroscience-based Memory and law  6 
research has made considerable progress in unraveling the neural basis of memory. However, 
reference to such research is notably absent in the New Jersey court’s decision. We do not 
believe that this omission reflects any kind of divergence between the broad view of human 
memory emerging from cognitive psychology on the one hand and cognitive neuroscience on the 
other. Although neuroscientists have tended to focus less on memory distortions and illusions 
than have cognitive psychologists, many neuroscience-based approaches to memory have 
embraced the idea that, far from operating like a video recorder, memory is a constructive, 
dynamic process that is sometimes prone to error
16-19. Despite this broad agreement from the two 
approaches, attempts to identify and understand the brain mechanisms underlying memory, 
which are so central to cognitive neuroscience, are less directly related to the concerns of the 
court – which is charged with assessing the behavioral output of the memory system – than is 
work from cognitive psychology. While it is thus unsurprising that the New Jersey court did not 
cite neuroscience evidence in its decision and formulation of the new jury instructions, we think 
that it is important to consider the relation between memory as studied by neuroscience, and 
memory in the legal context: What contribution – if any – can neuroscience-based research on 
memory and the brain make to grappling with issues pertaining to memory in the courtroom? 
Does cognitive neuroscience have anything useful to tell jurors or other participants in the legal 
system about the likely accuracy of an eyewitness account, or about why “human memory is not 
like a video recording that a witness need only replay to remember what happened”? 
Distinguishing true and false memories with neuroimaging 
One way in which cognitive neuroscience research might inform the courts about 
memory concerns the difficult problem of distinguishing between true or accurate memories on 
the one hand and false or inaccurate ones on the other. Even though psychologists generally Memory and law  7 
acknowledge that eyewitness memory is sometimes accurate and sometimes not, no definitive 
cognitive-behavioral methods exist for distinguishing true from false memories
20. Thus, an 
exciting possibility is that neuroscientists could use brain imaging techniques, such as functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) or event-related potentials (ERPs), to provide a clear answer 
as to whether a witness to a crime is recounting a true or a false memory. 
During the past 15 years, a growing number of studies have shown that neuroimaging 
techniques, including fMRI and ERPs, can sometimes help distinguish true memories from false 
ones under laboratory conditions (for detailed review, see 
21-23). Many neuroimaging studies have 
used experimental paradigms in which participants initially study lists of semantically associated 
words or perceptually similar visual shapes. Later, experimenters scan the participants as they 
make old/new recognition decisions about three different kinds of items: old items that appeared 
earlier in the list; semantically or perceptually related new items that did not appear previously; 
or unrelated new items that did not appear previously. Participants in these experiments typically 
classify the old items as ‘old’ much more frequently than they classify the new, unrelated items 
as ‘old’, which constitutes evidence for true or veridical memory. The critical result is that 
participants also classify new, related items as ‘old’ much more frequently than new, unrelated 
items; these incorrect responses to the related items constitute evidence for false memories (e.g., 
24-27). Other neuroimaging studies have examined false memories that result from confusing 
perception and imagination
28, 29. For example, after seeing pictures of some objects (e.g., a photo 
of a car) and imagining others in response to a verbal cue (e.g., ‘imagine a ball’), participants 
sometimes falsely remember that they saw a picture of an item that they only imagined (i.e., a 
ball). Still other neuroimaging studies have examined false memories that result from the 
presentation of misinformation after viewing an everyday event 
30-32. For example, after watching Memory and law  8 
a man steal a woman’s wallet, some subjects receive misinformation about what actually 
happened (e.g., the woman’s arm was hurt during the robbery, rather than her neck), which they 
later remember as part of the original event.  
Such studies have typically shown that many of the same brain regions are active for true 
memories (i.e., ‘old’ responses to old items) and false memories (i.e., ‘old’ responses to related, 
imagined, or suggested items), and have also documented some differences. For example, several 
studies have reported that brain regions involved in encoding or retrieving sensory-perceptual 
information tend to be more active during retrieval of true than false memories (e.g., 
24-27,29,32). 
Although the precise regions that distinguish true from false memories vary from study-to-study, 
the results are generally in line with the sensory reactivation hypothesis that emerged from 
earlier behavioral studies showing that true memories tend to be associated with retrieval of 
greater sensory and perceptual detail than false memories
33. However, neuroimaging evidence for 
sensory reactivation comes from studies where researchers test memory shortly after exposure to 
target information.  Given the tendency for recollection of sensory details to fade over time
5,8, 
such effects would presumably be more difficult to detected at longer delays (i.e., weeks or 
months). Evidence also exists that regions within anterior prefrontal cortex, especially in the 
right hemisphere, tend to be preferentially activated for false as compared with true memories, 
perhaps signaling a role for anterior prefrontal cortex in memory monitoring or evaluation 
26,27, 
34,35. 
In light of these and related findings
21-23, it is tempting to imagine that the legal system 
could rely on neuroimaging to help determine whether an eyewitness is remembering accurately 
or not. However, there are several reasons to be skeptical about the use of neuroimaging 
evidence concerning true versus false memories in the courtroom. First, laboratory studies have Memory and law  9 
generally used simple and easy-to-control materials, such as words and pictures, but it is unclear 
whether results from these studies generalize to the kinds of complex everyday events that are 
more typically encountered in the courtroom; indeed, a recent literature review reveals notable 
differences in the patterns of brain activity that are evident when people remember information 
presented in the laboratory versus autobiographical recollections of rich everyday experiences
36. 
Second, neuroimaging studies of true vs. false memories typically use healthy young adult 
participants, whereas the courtroom typically includes more diverse populations. Third, as we 
noted above, such studies involve relatively brief delays between study and test, whereas 
courtroom cases usually involve much longer delays, and we do not yet know whether 
neuroimaging can distinguish true and false memories over delays that may involve months or 
more. Fourth, neuroimaging evidence for true-false memory differences comes from studies in 
which experimenters average brain activity across subjects and events, reflecting the fact that it 
is difficult to detect meaningful memory-related activity on single trials in individual subjects 
with techniques such as fMRI – yet that is precisely what courtroom cases demand. Researchers 
have made some progress in this regard by using pattern classifiers to analyze brain activity. In 
one study using such multivoxel pattern analysis
37, participants studied faces of unfamiliar 
people and one hour later made old/new recognition judgments about previously studied faces as 
well as new faces that had not been previously studied. A classifier determined reliably whether 
individual participants subjectively experience a face as old or new. But the classifier could not 
reliably determine the objective status of the face – that is, whether it is in fact old or new – 
which would be critically important in a courtroom setting. Similarly, neuroimaging studies that 
have examined the neural correlates of subjective confidence in memory have generally found 
that fMRI responses in various memory-related regions are heavily influenced by subjective Memory and law  10 
confidence signals and less so by objective accuracy (for review, see
38). Fifth, even if 
neuroimaging develops to a point where it can provide reliable discrimination between true and 
false memories in individual cases, researchers would have to develop procedures to detect 
countermeasures that individuals might use to ‘beat the test’, yet we are not aware of any such 
procedures (for further discussion of this point and related concerns, see 
22). 
While we expect that future advances in neuroimaging technology and analysis will 
eventually address these and other problems, they are presently significant ones that warrant a 
cautionary stance concerning the potential application of neuroimaging approaches to 
adjudicating questions about true versus false memories in the courtroom.   
Several authors have expressed similar concerns regarding the potential use of 
neuroimaging techniques for detecting intentional deception in legal cases (for reviews, see
39,40). 
Some laboratory studies have shown that regions within the prefrontal cortex tend to be more 
active when participants are lying than when they are telling the truth, likely reflecting the 
involvement of frontally-based executive processes during the manipulation and monitoring of 
information that is used to construct a lie
41. One recent laboratory fMRI study showed that 
activity patterns in specific prefrontal regions could distinguish lies from truth telling with great 
accuracy in individual subjects
42. However, that same study showed that when experimenters 
instructed participants to use countermeasures designed to beat the test, there was a dramatic 
reduction in the ability of fMRI responses to distinguish lies from truth. Because 
countermeasures are a significant concern in real-world settings, the authors of this study advised 
caution in applying fMRI-based lie detection outside the laboratory. This view is in line with 
previous cautionary arguments concerning the application of neural lie detection procedures to 
the courtroom, which point to such problems as the use of artificial laboratory tasks, inconsistent Memory and law  11 
results across laboratories, lack of diversity in the subject populations tested (i.e., mainly healthy 
young adults), and an absence of evidence for the efficacy of neural lie detection procedures in 
real-world contexts
39.  
Understanding the neural basis of true and false memories 
There is another way in which neuroscience research could potentially inform the legal 
system: by providing information about the neural mechanisms of memory errors and distortions 
that can enhance understanding of why it is that “human memory is not like a video recording.” 
We noted earlier that neuroimaging studies have typically shown that many of the same brain 
areas are active during retrieval of true and false memories, including regions in prefrontal, 
parietal, and medial temporal cortices
21-23. This finding could be useful for policy makers and 
judges in determining how to properly instruct juries about the reasons why false memories can 
be subjectively compelling: some of the same processes contribute to both true and false 
memories
8, 9, 21-23.  
A nice example of this point comes from the finding
43 that many of the same brain 
regions are active when participants accurately recognize visual shapes they viewed earlier and 
when they falsely recognize related (i.e., perceptually similar) shapes that they did not see earlier 
– but there is virtually no overlap in brain activity during accurate recognition of previously 
viewed shapes and false recognition of new, unrelated (i.e., perceptually dissimilar) shapes. The 
overlapping brain activity during true recognition of studied shapes and false recognition of 
related shapes likely reflects shared underlying processes. Participants make ‘old’ responses in 
these cases based on visual similarity or ‘gist’ information, which in this experimental paradigm 
refers to visual features that the related lure and the studied shapes share (e.g., similar line 
configurations, contours, and colors). Other studies have revealed that false memories sometimes Memory and law  12 
result from relying on semantic or conceptual gist information
5,6,8,9, such as when an individual 
inaccurately remembers studying a word (e.g., gold) that did not appear earlier but is 
semantically related to items that did appear earlier (e.g., bronze, silver, brass
35). Neuroimaging 
data indicate that brain regions involved in semantic or conceptual processing can contribute to 
both true and false memories that are based on semantic information
9,24,35. Such findings could be 
useful in guiding the crafting of jury instructions that could explain some of the reasons why 
false memories can occur. 
Consider next the well-established finding that people sometimes confuse memory with 
imagination. Cognitive studies have shown, for example, that simply imagining an event that 
might have occurred in one’s personal past can increase confidence or belief that the event 
actually occurred
44, lead individuals to claim that they performed actions that they in fact only 
imagined
45, or result in the production of specific and detailed false memories of events that 
never actually happened
7. Recent findings that have revealed striking neural overlap between 
memory and imagination can provide insight into the basis of such false memories. A growing 
number of neuroimaging studies have shown that instructing people to remember actual past 
events from their personal pasts and imagine hypothetical events that might occur in their 
personal futures recruits a common core network comprised of medial temporal lobes including 
hippocampus, medial prefrontal and medial parietal regions including retrosplenial cortex and 
posterior cingulate, and lateral temporal and lateral parietal regions (e.g.,
46). Moreover, 
neuroimaging studies have also shown that cognitive confusions between imagination and 
memory sometimes reflect increased activity in regions associated with visual imagery during 
memory encoding or retrieval
28, 29. These findings provide information concerning the neural Memory and law  13 
basis of imagination and memory that could be helpful in further developing jury instructions 
that explain how and why the former can be mistaken for the latter. 
Misinformation effects and memory reconsolidation 
Similar considerations may apply to the well-established misinformation effect, which 
occurs when misleading suggestions or inaccurate information presented after an event result in 
distorted memory for the original event (for review, see
11). Neuroimaging studies have added to 
our understanding of the misinformation effect by revealing that the effect reflects, in part, the 
degree or strength of the encoding of the original event versus degree of encoding of the 
subsequent misinformation. For example, in one study
31 experimenters scanned participants 
while they viewed an initial event – a vignette consisting of a sequence of photographs -- and 
also during a subsequent misinformation phase when they viewed the same vignette but with 
several details altered from the original. The results showed that encoding-related activity in 
several brain regions during the original and misinformation phases, most notably in the left 
hippocampus and perirhinal cortex, predicts subsequent true or false memory: greater activity in 
these regions during the original event sequence is associated with accurate subsequent memory, 
whereas greater activity in these regions during the misinformation phase is associated with 
inaccurate subsequent memory (see
30 for similar results).  
In an interesting recent twist on the standard misinformation paradigm that emphasizes 
social influences on memory accuracy
47, participants who receive misinformation from other 
individuals who witnessed a movie with them sometimes commit memory errors despite 
warnings that the information that the others presented is untrustworthy. Critically, the effect is 
associated with increased recruitment of, and connectivity between, hippocampus and amygdala 
during encoding of the misinformation. In a non-social control experiment in which a computer Memory and law  14 
algorithm presented the misinformation rather than other people, the hippocampal effect is again 
observed but the amygdala effect is not, suggesting that the latter may reflect specifically social 
influences on memory. These and the aforementioned neuroimaging findings complement and 
extend the results of behavioral studies of the misinformation effect
11 and thus are of potential 
relevance to those attempting to instruct jurors concerning the nature and basis of misinformation 
effects.  
As a final example of how neuroscience-based research might be relevant to 
understanding memory accuracy in legal settings, consider the phenomenon of reconsolidation, 
where reactivated memories enter a transient state of instability in which they are prone to 
disruption or change. Evidence for reconsolidation has come mainly from studies of non-human 
animals, where infusion of a protein synthesis inhibitor such as anisomycin into the lateral and 
basal amygdala during reactivation of an already consolidated auditory fear conditioning 
memory disrupts subsequent long-term retention of the auditory fear memory (for reviews, 
see
16,17,48). Although experiments have demonstrated reconsolidation for various kinds of 
memories, they have also established boundary conditions on the phenomenon; for example, 
some evidence indicates that older memories are less susceptible to reconsolidation than are 
recent ones
48 There are also some findings consistent with reconsolidation in humans (e.g.,
49-51). 
For example, in one study
51 researchers induced fear conditioning by pairing a picture of a 
colored square with an electrical shock, such that presentation of the square eventually elicits a 
physiological fear response. A day later, reactivating the fear memory by presenting the colored 
square without shock 10 minutes before a series of extinction trials that repeatedly present the 
square without shock – an interval that falls within the time window in which researchers think 
that reconsolidation processes exert an effect – results in a long-lasting reduction of fear Memory and law  15 
responses to the square, suggesting an effective rewriting of the original memory. By contrast, 
reactivating the fear memory six hours before the extinction procedure – a time interval that falls 
outside the reconsolidation window – does not have a long-lasting effect on fear reduction.  
Reconsolidation may be a mechanism for updating memories with current information to 
keep them relevant
17,48. In so doing, however, this updating mechanism may also contribute to 
changes and distortions in memory over time as a consequence of memory reactivation 
9,16,17. 
Recent behavioral evidence is consistent with this view, showing that reactivation can increase 
both true and false memories
52. Note that a similar updating account may apply to the 
misinformation effect
11, and there has been discussion of possible links between reconsolidation 
mechanisms and the misinformation effect
17. Thus, although much work remains to be done to 
document and understand the neural basis of reconsolidation in humans, neuroscience-based 
research on reconsolidation potentially provides a foundation for understanding how memories 
can change over time. This phenomenon is clearly relevant to the legal system, especially in 
situations where suggestive questioning during the investigative process may introduce 
misinformation into a witness’s memory. Consequently, research on reconsolidation could 
potentially add to work on misinformation in determining how to properly instruct juries 
concerning the nature of memory. 
Concluding comments 
  Will modern neuroscience more generally, and brain scans more particularly, enter the 
courtroom anytime soon? They already have, in several ways. For example, some attorneys have 
used this type of evidence to mitigate the responsibility of defendants who commit crimes, 
arguing to the effect that ‘a bad brain made him do it’
53. In one Florida murder case, where brain Memory and law  16 
images of the defendant were introduced as evidence, jurors voted for a sentence of life without 
parole rather than the death penalty
54. 
  But given the relatively short life of scientific explorations of neuroimaging and complex 
memories that might be true and might be false, we believe that it is wise to be skeptical now of 
current efforts to introduce neuroimaging data into the courtroom arena as evidence in individual 
cases where memory accuracy is at issue (see also
55). We have suggested that evidence from 
neuroscience, including neuroimaging studies, is consistent with and can broaden our 
understanding of evidence from cognitive psychology in showing that memory is a dynamic, 
constructive process that is sometimes prone to error and distortion. Thus, neuroscience evidence 
concerning memory, together with evidence from cognitive psychology, could play a role in 
educating jurors and other participants in the legal system generally about the nature of memory.   
   However, we draw a distinction between such a general educational role and the 
application of neuroimaging data to individual cases. If the prosecution seeks to introduce fMRI 
evidence from a “memory truth detection” procedure to substantiate their claims that a witness is 
accurately remembering, or the defense wants to introduce other fMRI evidence to substantiate 
claims that a witness has a false memory, the court should apply the standards for admission of 
scientific evidence that apply in that jurisdiction, usually either the so-called Daubert or Frye 
standard as well as other evidentiary rules, to determine whether the evidence should reach the 
jurors. This is not only because of the uncertainties concerning the interpretation and reliability 
of fMRI evidence concerning true and false memories in individual cases that we discussed 
earlier, but also because people in general, and jurors in particular, are sometimes impressed with 
evidence from brain imaging and may be unduly influenced by it
56,57.  Memory and law  17 
  For example, presentation of fMRI images may increase judgments of the scientific 
credibility of actual and hypothetical findings even when the information that the images provide  
is largely redundant with text
56. In another study, mock jurors received trial information that 
included evidence that the defendant was lying about having committed a crime. When 
accompanied by brain scans, the lie detection evidence produces more guilty verdicts than when 
accompanied by other evidence such as polygraph or thermal facial imaging
57. Although effects 
of brain scans on juror decision making are not always observed
58, it is nonetheless noteworthy 
that in a recent murder case in which the defense sought to introduce fMRI evidence from a lie 
detection procedure to substantiate their claims that the defendant was telling the truth, the court 
did not allow the evidence after hearing expert testimony from both sides
59. 
  Looking to the future, there may come a time where neuroscience evidence will be better 
developed and will more often see its day in court. When that happens, the legal system may 
want to take a lesson from New Jersey v Henderson, and put in place a bold new solution. If it 
mirrored Henderson, then any showing that the neuroscience evidence might be problematic 
could lead to a hearing, and, if admitted, would be accompanied by “appropriate, tailored jury 
instructions” that contain critical information about, for example, neuroimaging evidence and 
how jurors ought to think about it.  In a case where the neuroimaging evidence pertained to 
distinguishing between true and false memories, we would hope that concerns like those we 
raised earlier would be brought to the attention of the jurors. Finding ways to educate jurors 
before they make decisions that affect someone’s liberty, and more generally doing all that we 
can do to increase the chances of a just verdict, is an effort that deserves our sustained attention. Memory and law  18 
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